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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 10, 2006, Xinhua, the Chinese Communist Party's official
news agency,' released the "Measures for Administering the Release of News
and Information in China by Foreign News Agencies" ("Measures") to serve as
new regulations on all information provided by foreign news organizations to
domestic Chinese customers Normally, the Measures may well have stayed
under the international radar because the foreign media had long been
accustomed to general regulation by Xinhua and a climate of strict control and
censorship practices in China.'
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2008. I would like to
thank my family and friends for their support and encouragement throughout the writing and editing process.
1. See Press Reference, China Press, Media, TV, Radio, Newspapers at 11, http://www.pressreference.
com/Be-Co/china.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2007)(stating that Xinhua is considered to be a propaganda tool as
the only CCP mandated news agency in China).
2. Measures for Administering the Release of News and Information in Cfiina by Foreign News
Agencies (promulgated by Xinhua News Agency, Sept. 10, 2006), translated at http://www.china.org.cn/
english/govemment/1 80689.htm [hereinafter Measures].
3. See Andrew Browne, China's Media Curbs Aim to Bolster Xinhua, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2006, at A4
(explaining that foreign newspapers and periodicals published overseas and distributed in China are subject to
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However, Xinhua's Measures are now aimed at foreign financial data
companies, prohibiting these agencies from distributing financial data directly to
Chinese consumers." In addition, the Measures require the submission of
financial information to Xinhua or its affiliates, who have authority to delete any
material they deem offensive prior to release.5
The Measures prompted immediate concern that Xinhua was simply trying to
take control of China's $100 million financial data market by eliminating
competition and gleaning design and process trade secrets from the information
that would now be filtered through them.6 In addition, the Measures appear to be
in clear violation of China's commitments to the World Trade Organization
(WTO), one of which was to allow greater access to their financial sector over a
five year compliance period.' In fact, China had agreed that foreign financial
companies would have virtually unrestricted access by the end of this five year
period, which ended in December 2006.8 Xinhua's release of more restrictive
regulations just three months before this time was interpreted as bad news for
press freedoms, as well as other areas of WTO compliance.9
However, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) took a moderate
approach in a report issued to Congress at the end of China's 5-year compliance
period on December 11, 2006.'0 The report called China's overall compliance
record "decidedly mixed" and simply noted that the U.S. may later decide to
pursue formal WTO dispute resolution if bilateral agreements should fail."
Although the USTR report specifically identified the Measures' restrictions
on the distribution of financial data as a key area of concern, it did not
strict controls and only available in a few newsstand locations such as tourist hotels).
4. See Measures, supra note 2, at art. 12 (stating that Xinhua News Agency has the right to select the
news and information released by foreign news agencies in China).
5. See id. at art. 12 (stating that Xinhua may delete any materials as specified in Article 11 of these
Measures).
6. See Simon Elegant, China's Unwelcome Mat, TIME ASIA, Sept. 25, 2006, available at http://www.
time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501060925-1535892,00.html.
7. See Working Party Report-Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2 at 35 (Oct. 1, 2001).
8. See Brian Bremner & Dexter Roberts, How Beijing is Keeping Banks at Bay, BUSINESS WEEK
ONLINE, Oct. 2, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_40/b4003071 (last visited on Nov.
4, 2006) (stating that Dec. 11, 2006 [was] to be a "red-letter day" for Chinese banks, when the mainland's
finance sector [was] to be fully opened to foreign banks under commitments Beijing made when it joined the
WTO).
9. See generally Jose Manuel Barroso, European Commission President, Remarks at Summit in
Helsinki, Finland (Sept. 11, 2006) (with regards to the newly promulgated Measures, Barroso stated "Any kind
of restrictions on the freedom of the press, increasing the intervention of the state, is a very negative
development). See also Melinda Liu, Silent Games, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2006, available at http://www.
msnbc.msn.comV14909941/site/newsweek (discussing concerns for the 2008 Summer Olympics, when some
20,000 international journalists are expected to cover the Games in Beijing).
10. See UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA'S WTO
COMPLIANCE 5 (2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document Library/ReportsPublications/2006/
asset_uploadfile688_10223.pdf [hereinafter USTR REPORT].
11. Id.
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 20
recommend immediate WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 2  Financial
incentives, compliance in other areas of trade and other greater noncompliance
problems in areas such as intellectual property rights (IPR) and agriculture most
likely combined to overshadow the significance of the Measures' impact on the
financial services sector. 13
This comment argues that the U.S. and other WTO member countries should
not take a "wait and see" approach or rely upon market forces to remedy China's
non-compliance in the financial services sector. Rather, China's disregard for
their commitments in this area demands early, aggressive action such as formal
dispute settlement in order to send a strong message that selective compliance
will not be tolerated. To accomplish this, the following sections will explain why
the promulgation of the Measures is an especially blatant act of noncompliance
meriting special attention, in light of the historical, political, cultural and
economic influences on China's entry into the world economy.
Part II of this paper will discuss the history of Chinese media controls, which
is critical to the understanding of the current climate of censorship and control
that surrounds the most recent regulations. Part III will explore the purpose and
timing of the Measures, as well as the Measures' similarity with an attempt by
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) a decade earlier to control the flow of
financial information through Xinhua.14 This section will also address the
Measures' implications on the global market and the day-to-day operations of
financial companies. The Measures may result in exposure to corporate liability
because corporate directors may lack the timely financial information they need
to adequately advise clients and make informed business decisions. 5
Additionally, corporate directors must also be aware of the risks associated with
violating the measures, whether inadvertent or deliberate. 16
Part IV argues that the Measures clearly contradict China's pledge to the
WTO to gradually allow foreign financial institutions unlimited access to provide
services to all Chinese clients,'7 and examines what consequences China may
12. See id. at 9, 86 (stating that the U.S. will continue to monitor this situation closely in 2007).
13. See id. at 60, 70 (stating that China still used unnecessary and seemingly arbitrary inspection-related
import requirements that continued to impose burdens and regulatory uncertainty on U.S. agricultural producers
exporting to China in 2006. The report also cites IPR enforcement as one of China's greatest shortcomings as a
trading partner).
14. See Human Rights Watch, China: The Cost of Putting Business First, Vol. 8, No. 7 at 9 (July 1996),
available at http://hrw.org/reports/1996/China2.htm.
15. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 276 (West Group 2000) (noting that courts are
typically more willing to find a breach of bank directors' duty of care than the directors of non-banking
corporations).
16. See id. at 314 (discussing breach of duty to the corporation which may result from situations in
which a company has reason to disobey a law from the standpoint of profit maximization); see also Measures,
supra note 2, at art. 17 (setting forth penalties for subscribers).
17. See Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO News Press Release/243 (Sept. 17, 2001),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres0 le/pr243_e.htm.
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face by imposing these regulations just months before the end of its 5-year
compliance period as a member of the WTO.
Part V concludes by proposing that any financial gains that Xinhua hopes to
realize by taking control of the financial information market are likely to be
offset by diminished credibility, especially if the latest restrictive measures are
part of a larger, protectionist plan to advance domestic industries and service
providers. Not only do the Measures undermine China's commitments to the
WTO, they are undoubtedly a huge step back in terms of progress toward
sustainable growth, common prosperity and China's development of a fair and
transparent law-based economic system.'"
II. HISTORY OF CHINESE MEDIA
Critical to understanding Xinhua's new Measures is the historical treatment
of the media in China. As a monopolistic regime, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) emphasizes central control of the press as a tool for public education,
propaganda, and mass mobilization.' 9 Although Article 35 of the Constitution of
the People's Republic of China (PRC) stipulates that citizens of the PRC enjoy
freedom of speech and press, the government exerts strict censorship and control
over the media.20 China's constitution is more theoretical than practical; it is not
directly enforceable in the courts, so it is largely a political statement of general
principles, policies and goals."
The first method of media control is a strict registration and licensing
system.22 As stipulated by the 1990 Provisional Regulations on Newspaper
Management, all applications for publishing newspapers must be approved by the
State Press and Publications Administration (SPPA), the government's official
media monitor, and all newspapers must carry an official registration number.
23
With the exception of "jiguan bao", or party organs, all must cover an area of
specialization (such as economy, law, health, etc.) and must have a "zhuguan
bumen", or responsible department, to provide leadership and control.24 Thus, all
news publications are controlled by agencies under party control, preventing the
18. See Press Release, American Chamber of Commerce, People's Republic of China, Statement of
Concern Regarding the new Regulation on International News Agencies Issued by the Xinhua News Agency
(September 20, 2006) (on file with Pacific McGeorge Global Business and Development Law Journal) (urging
Chinese government to suspend regulations which are viewed as a threat to the development of a modern,
information-based economy).
19. See generally Perry Keller, Privilege and Punishment: Press Governance in China, 21 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 87, 89 (2003).
20. See Press Reference, supra note 1, at 7.
21. See Keller, supra note 19, at 108.
22. Press Reference, supra note 1, at 7.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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creation of another general interest newspaper in an area that might compete with
the party organ.2
In China, both legislative and administrative governmental bodies have the
power to create laws.26 Because administrative interpretation varies, it is often
unclear which governmental body has ultimate responsibility for an individual
law.27 In addition, Chinese administrative practice frequently involves the use of
unpublished, informal regulatory documents whose lack of widespread publica-
tion leads to confusion.28 Chinese administrative officials also enjoy considerable
discretion, in part because the rapidly changing economic environment demands
flexibility.29
The drafting process is generally characterized by ambiguous drafting,
thereby enabling lawmakers to provide a summary of the parameters of regula-
tion without revealing potential policy alternatives. 3° As a result, Chinese legal
drafting is characterized by: "principle-like pronouncements; vagueness and
ambiguity; broadly worded discretions; undefined terms; omissions; and general
catch-all clauses."'" This flexibility allows for alteration as needed in accordance
with circumstances, but also lends itself to rampant abuse and corruption.32
Many government agencies are involved in reviewing and enforcing laws
related to information flowing within China, but the two primary censoring
agencies are the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) and the
State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT).33 GAPP issues
licenses to publishers, screens print and Internet publications, and has the power
to ban materials and shut down outlets. 34 SARFT has similar authority over radio,
television, film, and Internet broadcasts. 35 The most powerful monitoring body,
however, is the Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department (CPD),
which coordinates with GAPP and SARFT to make sure content is in line with
party doctrine."
25. Id.
26. Christopher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China's Capacity to Implement World Trade Organization
Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 399, 414 (2002).
27. Id. at 431.
28. Id. at 464.
29. Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law
Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 161, 177 (2001).
30. Duncan, supra note 26, at 418.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 419.
33. Carin Zissis, Media Censorship in China, Sept. 25, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11515/
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Xinhua news agency is the only CCP mandated news agency in China 37 and
describes itself as the "mouth and throat" of the CCP.3 s Considered by press
freedom organizations to be a propaganda tool, Xinhua is a major force in
China's print media because it reports directly to the Communist party's
Propaganda Department and employs more than 13,000 people in 102 bureaus
worldwide and 31 bureaus in China.39
The CCP restricts information flow by classifying a broad range of
information as "state secrets", including some information that may already be in
the public domain.40 News media are not allowed to cite any classified
documents, which is a policy of secrecy that Xinhua says protects the Party's and
national interests.'
China controls the redistribution of foreign news through print and broadcast
outlets, as well as through its Xinhua bureaus worldwide.42 The Internet age has
proven problematic for the CCP, because an unlimited audience can access
information, which may be provided from unlicensed electronic publications.43
The CCP has issued a number of rules and regulations to control Internet
content." Media must obtain a qualification certificate to disseminate information
online, and users charged with violating China's security laws can be punished
by life sentences in prison.4 ' The flow of information from the Internet is filtered,
in many cases with the help of programs that block certain websites and cancel
searches involving controversial words. 6
HI. MOST RECENT RESTRICTIONS ON FINANCIAL DATA
The financial information market has grown as China has integrated into the
world economy,47 and is now estimated to be worth $100 -million and growing.4 8
As China becomes a major player in the global economy, authorities are trying to
strike a balance between the widespread need for more financial information and
their goal of controlling content as a way to maintain power.49
37. Press Reference, supra note 1, at 11.
38. Liu, supra note 9.
39. Browne, supra note 3.
40. Press Reference, supra note 1, at 7.
41. Id.
42. Zissis, supra note 33.
43. Press Reference, supra note 1, at 13.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Zissis, supra note 33 (noting that this technology is often provided by U.S. companies such as
Yahoo, Microsoft and Google).
47. See Associated Press, Xinhua Defends Market Controls, Tries to Reassure Financial Subscribers,
(Sept.. 13, 2006), http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/060913/china-newscontrols.html (last visited on Sept. 25, 2006).
48. Browne, supra note 3.
49. See Zissis, supra note 33.
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Interestingly, foreign news services such as Reuters, Dow Jones and
Bloomberg have dominated this market 0 and have developed highly profitable
networks by selling up-to-the-minute stock quotes and news to over one thousand
Chinese clients.51
A. The "Measures"
On September 10, 2006, Xinhua released new regulations on all information
provided by foreign news organizations to domestic Chinese customers.52
Specifically, foreign agencies are no longer permitted to distribute financial data
directly to Chinese consumers,53 and instead are required to submit financial
information to Xinhua or its affiliates, who have authority to "delete offending
material" before release.4 As of September 10, 2006, Chinese banks, brokers or
newspapers who desire the foreign content can subscribe only through agents
approved by Xinhua.55
B. Real Effects of the Measures-Practical Considerations
It is still unclear how these new regulations will affect the day-to-day
operations of foreign financial agencies. Chinese officials insist that the
regulations require "no changes" in the way foreign correspondents report in
China.5 6 Moreover, China's Premier Wen Jiabao stated that Beijing "will ensure
the freedom and the rights of the foreign news media and foreign financial-
information agencies.""
Despite Xinhua's reassurances that Chinese banks and securities firms would
not lose access to foreign economic news that they need in order to do business,
the issue may not be if, but rather when they receive access." Xinhua is not
known for its speed in delivering news, and this could hurt China economically. 59
50. See Joseph Kahn, News Curbs Tightened in China, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, (Sept. 12, 2006),
available at http://www.iht.com/bin/print-ipub.php?file=/articles/2006/09/10 /business/rules.php.
51. See Associated Press, supra note 47.
52. See Measures, supra note 2.
53. See id. at art. 13.
54. Id. at art. 12.
55. Chua Chin Hon, Xinhua's Curb on Foreign Media is Bad News, STRAITS TIMES, (Sept. 16, 2006)
available at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=53083.
56. Liu, supra note 9.
57. Elegant, supra note 6.
58. See Associated Press, supra note 47 (stating that Xinhua will release about 45 items of financial
information daily, while agencies such as Reuters and Bloomberg offer continuous, real-time financial data and
news).
59. Chua Chin Hon, China : Wen Vows Free Flow of Financial News, STRAITS TIMES, (Sept. 14, 2006),
available at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-eastasia.asp?parentid=52908.
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Even the information that Xinhua chooses to release will come at a significantly
slower pace than that of most international agencies. 60
Foreign economic-news vendors will likely have to pay fees to Xinhua
affiliates who will act as sales agents,6' and the main agent will be the China
Economic Information Service (CEIS), a Xinhua subsidiary.62 This information
service is the business partner of Xinhua Finance, a Tokyo-listed news and
financial company run by U.S. businesswoman Fredy Bush. 63 However, in
response to criticisms Xinhua has insisted that it sought no economic gains from
the new regulations.64
The Japanese Jiji Press was the first foreign news agency to sign an agree-
ment with CEIS pursuant to the new Xinhua regulations. 65 CEIS Vice-President
Liang Xiangbin stressed that the CEIS would not seek inappropriate benefits or
to promote unfair competition by taking advantage of its agency status with
foreign news outlets.66
In order to release financial information in China, a foreign agency must
meet several criteria 67 before it can submit a written application to Xinhua.61 The
application procedures set forth are quite detailed, requiring foreign news
agencies to produce a license from their home country, records showing that the
agency is in good standing, a detailed list explaining the news and information to
be released as well as samples, an illustration of its transmitting means and other
materials "as specified" by Xinhua. 69 Xinhua will then have twenty days in which
to issue an approval document or give a reason for denial. If approved, the
foreign agency must then sign an agency agreement with their designated Xinhua
affiliate, and submit that agreement to Xinhua within 15 days.70 If the agency
60. Associated Press, supra note 47.
61. See Browne, supra note 3 (quoting information service official Zhang Dongmei, "Currently we don't
charge fees, but we might do so in the future").
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Hon, supra note 59.
65. Xinhua News Agency, "News Agreement" Signed by China and Japan, (Sept. 20, 2006), available
at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Sep/181721 .htm.
66. Id.
67. Article 5 states that: To apply for releasing news and information in China, a foreign news agency
shall meet the following requirements: (1) being legally qualified in its home country or region; (2) enjoying
good credit in the field of news and information release; (3) having an explicit scope of business; (4) possessing
the technological and transmitting means commensurate with its business; and (5) other requirements as
prescribed by Chinese laws and administrative regulations). See Measures, supra note 2 at art. 5
68. See id. at art. 6.
69. Article 6 provides that: a foreign news agency shall submit a written application and the following
materials to Xinhua News Agency: (1) legal credentials issued by the competent authorities of its home country
or region; (2) its records of good credit issued by the relevant organization of its home country or region; (3) a
detailed list, explanation and samples of the news and information release; (4) an illustration of its transmitting
means; and (5) other materials as specified by Xinhua News Agency. Id.
70. Article 9 Provides: Before releasing news and information in China in accordance with the scope of
business approved in the approval document, a foreign news agency shall sign an agency agreement with the
designated entity, and within 15 days from the date of the agreement is signed, submit the agreement to Xinhua
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makes any changes to its scope of business or transmitting means, it must begin
the application process all over again to receive a new approval document.'
Once approval is established, the foreign agencies and their designated
12affiliates will be required to submit annual reports regarding their activities .
This information may then prompt examination and inspection by Xinhua.73 Only
those agencies that pass such inspection will be permitted to continue with their
news and information release and agency business.74
In turn, a user in China who wishes to subscribe to news and information
provided by a foreign agency must sign a subscription agreement with the
designated entity and is expressly forbidden from directly subscribing to,
translating, editing or publishing the news and information released by a foreign
news agency.75 When a Chinese user wants to use foreign news or information,
they must clearly indicate the sources and may not transfer them to another party
76in any form.
The Measures set forth penalties in the event of a violation by a foreign news
agency, and range from a warning, to suspension or cancellation of qualifications
to release news in China.77 The same penalties will apply to Chinese subscribers,8
and all people are authorized, if not encouraged, to report violations to Xinhua.79
Xinhua has planned for possible efforts by foreign financial firms to get
around the requirements and avoid penalties by providing information through a
subsidiary or setting up "dummy" companies to deliver the information directly
to subscribers.8° An agent that distributes news and information of a foreign news
agency without approval of Xinhua will be ordered immediately to cease
distribution and will face disciplinary penalties."
Even if the regulations do not substantially impair the day-to-day operations
of financial information services, they were promulgated amidst other moves that
some perceive to be aimed at limiting foreign firms' ability to do business in
News Agency for the record). Id. at art. 9
71. See id. at art. 10 (stating that before altering its scope of business, transmitting means, etc., a foreign
news agency shall apply anew to Xinhua News Agency for an approval document).
72. Id. at art. 14.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at art. 13.
76. Id.
77. Id. at art. 16.
78. See id. at art. 17 (setting forth provisions similar to those of art. 16 for users in China, but involving
the use, transfer, or improper citation of news and information from foreign news agencies).
79. Id. at art. 15.
80. See id. at art. 19 (stating that where a designated entity violates the provisions of the Measures by
acting an agent for distribution of the news and information of a foreign news agency that has not obtained
Xinhua approval, Xinhua shall order it to rectify, and disciplinary penalties shall be imposed on the persons
directly in charge and any other persons directly responsible).
81. Id. at art. 18.
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China.12 For example, on September 14, 2006, China's stock-market regulator
temporarily banned investment by foreign brokerages in domestic securities
firms, in an effort to supposedly allow local industry to consolidate so that
Chinese firms would be large enough to compete globally. 3 Earlier, in late
August 2006, the Ministry of Commerce issued new rules on mergers and
acquisitions, including a number of vague provisions that appeared to give the
Ministry wide powers to review and halt mergers. s' These merger provisions
came just one month after China's securities regulator published a new takeover
code, which declared that acquisitions involving publicly trading companies
"must not harm national security or the public interest". 5 The combination of
these developments in late 2006 contributed to the widely felt perception of a
"dampening of enthusiasm ... for foreign participation in the [Chinese]
economy.""
Indeed, it has been characteristic of socialist economies to apply one set of
laws to domestic businesses and an entirely different, often less favorable, set of
laws to foreign businesses. 7 Even as China has shifted towards a more open
economy with its WTO accession,8 its socialist background may still feed into a
climate of mistrust towards foreign firms, characterized by protectionist and
discriminatory regulations.89 China may be utilizing a strategy of selective
compliance, meeting its basic WTO commitments at a minimal level sufficient to
keep a legal challenge at bay while introducing subtle regulations designed to
gradually shift power to Chinese banks and CCP agencies like Xinhua.90
Financial and commodity markets depend on real-time information. 9' Not
only will Chinese market participants suffer a distinct competitive disadvantage
92from their lack of access to up-to-the-minute data, but liability issues may arise
82. See James T. Areddy, China Halts Brokerage Growth, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2006, at C 10 (stating
that the China Securities Regulatory Commission had signaled in 2006 that it didn't want to let more foreigners
enter the brokerage industry, and that even foreign companies in other sectors from banking to construction
equipment have faced bureaucratic hurdles).
83. Id.
84. See Andrew Batson & Mei Fong, In Strategic Shift, China Hits Foreign Investors With New Hurdles,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2006 at Al.
85. Id.
86. USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
87. See Duncan, supra note 26, at 423 (describing the difference that develops in socialist economies for
treatment for domestic and foreign business).
88. See id. (stating that there have been fundamental shifts in China's official stance on foreign
involvement).
89. Id. at 423-24.
90. See Bremner & Roberts, supra note 8 (discussing protectionist tone of financial services
regulations).
91. See Press Release, American Chamber of Commerce, People's Republic of China, supra note 18.
92. If Chinese market participants are deprived of immediate access to the information available to
market participants elsewhere in the world, they will be at a competitive disadvantage, which in turn will limit
the development of China's financial and commodity markets, with negative effects on the banking industry and
the efficiency of capital allocation). See id.
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for international companies with offices in China who are required to be
reasonably informed before making business decisions or advising clients.93 The
very decision to establish a branch or office in China may expose corporate
directors to litigation if a firm's ability to make timely decisions and reasonable
inquiries into relevant facts is compromised.94 On the other hand, corporate
directors tempted to defy Xinhua's regulations by directly subscribing to
financial news services could risk breaching their duty of care by exposing the
corporation to sanctions for violating the Measures.9 Directors cannot simply
turn a blind eye to corporate misconduct, and the nature and extent of reasonable
care required depends on the type of corporation, its size and financial
resources. 96 Banks in particular are held to a stricter standard of accountability,
due to their relationship with the public and depositors. 97
C. History Repeats Itself
Xinhua has attempted to take control of the financial news industry before.98
In 1996, officials announced that Xinhua was to supervise foreign wire services
selling economic information, such as Dow Jones and Reuters, so that it could
screen for "false economic news and attacks on China",99 and demanded a 40%
share of the revenue of foreign economic-news providers, as well as their
technical secrets and product specifications, before backing down due to an
intense lobbying effort.' Xinhua tried to further intimidate Dow Jones and
Reuters by threatening to cut off the satellite signal to Dow Jones and Reuters'
customers in southern Guangdong province on June 30, 1997, unless they
registered with the Chinese agency.'0 ' In addition, the services were to be
prohibited from increasing the number of Chinese subscribers, and foreign wire
services already in China were required to apply for permission to continue. 
°2
This move, however, was poorly timed and lacked coordination with other
Chinese ministries.' 3 Thanks to the efforts of the targeted media agencies who
93. See GEVURTZ, supra note 15, at 276 (noting that courts are typically more willing to find a breach of
bank directors' duty of care than the directors of non-banking corporations).
94. See Model Business Corporation Act § 8.30(b) (requiring directors to exercise care when becoming
informed in connection with their decision-making function or devoting attention to their oversight function).
95. See GEVURTZ, supra note 15, at 314 (discussing breach of duty to the corporation which may result
from situations in which a company has reason to disobey a law from the standpoint of profit maximization).
96. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821 (N.J. 1981).
97. Id.
98. Browne, supra note 3.
99. Human Rights Watch, supra note 14.
100. Browne, supra note 3.
101. Hon, supra note 55.
102. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 14.
103. June 30, 1997 was the same day that the British government handed Hong Kong back to China, so
Xinhua had inadvertently scheduled to cut off access to the world's financial markets in China's most
financially sophisticated province closest to Hong Kong, on the very day Hong Kong would be returned to
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fiercely opposed these restrictions, as well as the subsequent bilateral agreements
leading to China's WTO accession in 2001, the next decade brought relatively
greater access to Chinese financial consumers.'" Economic-news agencies were
allowed to distribute financial and market news directly to Chinese clients,
including banks and brokerage firms.' 5
Foreign general newswires, however, have never been allowed to sell
directly to Chinese publications and have long been familiar with the requirement
of submitting all information to Xinhua.' °6 The distinction drawn between
financial news and general news is likely due to the fact that financial data is less
likely to contain material that the CCP considers inflammatory or socially
offensive.'0 7 If foreign news agencies make a showing of solidarity reminiscent of
their efforts in 1996 to fight access restrictions, they may not be so successful
this time.'"8 The media market in China has grown significantly since then, with
many new foreign agencies. "9 Although Reuters and Dow Jones easily teamed up
in 1996 to resist Xinhua, it is unclear how much of a united front can be formed
this time with so many different players and interests involved."" As news
agencies acquiesce to the new regulations, Xinhua may be able to "divide and
conquer.""'
D. Ulterior Motives
Xinhua may have been motivated by a desire to copy foreign financial
products from agencies such as Reuters,"' and will now have the opportunity to
study and analyze the layout and design of those delivery systems in the hopes of
moving away from its image as a propaganda machine and developing a more
professional look."'
China). See Hon, supra note 55.
104. Id.
105. Liu, supra note 9.
106. Browne, supra note 3.
107. See generally Thomas Fuller, New Chinese Rules Could Redirect Profits in Financial News Sector,
(Sept. 12, 2006), INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/121business/rules.
php, (last visited on Nov. 3, 2006) (referring to Xinhua's warning against journalism that threatens the country's
national unity, incites hatred, propagates obscenity or undermines cultural traditions).
108. See Hon, supra note 55 (stating that the last industry battle with Xinhua took nearly two years to




112. See Liu, supra note 9 (stating that Xinhua President Tian Congming is aiming to elevate its market
share in the industry of providing real-time financial data by "leapfrogging" ahead with its own financial data
services, copied from agencies such as Reuters); see also Browne, supra note 3 (quoting Tian Conming that
Xinhua's final goal is "basic replacement of the competition").
113. See China Confidential, Foreign Media Companies Confused by New Rules, (Sept. 23, 2006),
http://chinaconfidential.blogspot.com/2006/09/foreign-media-companies-confused-by.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2007).
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Interestingly, Xinhua claims to be acting under the authority of a 1996
authorization by the State Council to administer the release of economic
information in China by foreign news agencies.' 4 Xinhua insists that the newly
announced measures have no effect on the policy toward the administration of
overseas news agencies." 5 Since the 1996 authorization was largely neutralized
by efforts of the international media," 6 Xinhua cites the "Decision of the State
Council on Establishment of Administrative Licenses for Items Subject to
Examination and Approval That Need to Be Retained" of 2004 as "once again"
granting the right to conduct unified administration over the release of news and
information in China by foreign agencies."7
Xinhua's stance that things are just "business as usual" may be in response to
immediate criticisms that the Measures are simply an attempt to control the
foreign media and create a Chinese monopoly.' 18 Also, the announcement of the
Measures came during the week that Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao was on a
week-long, four-country tour of Europe, and ironically, it appeared that he had
not been informed of Xinhua's new Measures." 9 Wen was presented with
questions and struggled to clarify what he termed as "misunderstandings" about
the new rules.'20 If he had indeed been caught off guard, this may be the reason
that he sought to downplay the effects of the Measures by stating that "The
Chinese government will ensure the freedom and rights of the foreign news
media and foreign financial information agencies operating in China. Information
in commerce, finance and economic development will flow freely without any
obstructions."' 2
This wouldn't be the first time that media restrictions have come back to
haunt uninformed officials. In 1996 when U.S. trade negotiator Charlene
Barshefsky met then Chinese foreign trade minister Wu Yi for talks to allow
China into the WTO, Barshefsky took issue with the restrictions that Xinhua tried
to impose on the foreign news agencies. '2' According to an official source,
Madam Wu was apparently caught off guard by this information and openly
admonished Xinhua after the meeting.'
23
Xinhua maintains that the Measures are meant to promote the "sound and
orderly" distribution of news and are "aimed at protecting the legitimate rights of
114. See Xinhua News Agency, supra note 65 (stating that the newly announced Measures retain and
continue the 1996 authorization).
115. Id.
116. Hon, supra note 55.
117. Xinhua News Agency, supra note 65.
118. Elegant, supra note 6.
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foreign news agencies."' 24 In light of China's problems with rampant piracy,1
5
they claim that the new rules are aimed at protecting the intellectual property
rights (IPR) of foreign financial information vendors. 126 Coincidentally, China's
problems with IPR may explain why the WTO did not react more forcefully to
Xinhua's restrictions on financial data, instead preferring to take a "wait and see"
approach in 2007.27 The USTR report described IPR as a "key concern" and
described the improvement of IPR enforcement as a highest priority in 2006.128
Not only is the WTO's attention diverted to more substantial areas of non-
compliance, but any rules designed to further the goal of protecting IPR would be
less likely to face criticism, even if this does not reflect Xinhua's true motivation
for promulgating the Measures.
IV. COMMITMENTS UNDER THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
A. Inconsistencies Between Measures and WTO Commitments
On December 11, 2001, China became the 143rd full signatory to the World
Trade Organization after fifteen years of negotiations. 29 As a member of the
WTO, China is generally barred from restricting trade in financial information.'
30
Throughout the long and arduous negotiation period, the issue of foreign access
to the Chinese financial services industry received considerable attention.,3' In
bilateral agreements leading up to WTO accession, China agreed to undertake a
series of commitments to open and liberalize its markets in order to better
integrate into the world economy and offer a more predictable environment for
trade and foreign investment in accordance with WTO rules. 3 2 Most notably,
China agreed to provide non-discriminatory treatment to all WTO Members,
124. Associated Press, supra note 47.
125. See generally Jayanthi Iyengar, Intellectual Property Piracy Rocks China Boat, ASIA TIMES
ONLINE, (Sept. 16. 2004), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FI16AdO7.html (last visited on Oct. 20, 2006)
(stating that including U.S., European and Japanese firms, the losses on account of Chinese piracy is in excess
of $50 billion annually).
126. See China Media Blog, New Media Controls: Follow the Money, (Sept. 10, 2006), http://www.
chinamediablog.con/2006/09/10/new-media-controls-follow-the-money (last visited on Oct. 20, 2006)
(discussing claim by Xinhua that because such information is being pirated around the country, creating a single
channel for distribution will bring order to the market).
127. USTR REPORT, supra note 10.
128. Id. at 6.
129. See European Commission, Overview of China's Economic Reforms and WTO Negotiations,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/china/chr.htm (on file with Pacific McGeorge
Global Business and Development Law Journal).
130. See Press Release, World Trade Organization, supra note 17.
131. See USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 3 (stating that during the 15 years of negotiations leading up
to China's WTO accession, the U.S. and other WTO members were aware of the state's large role in China's
economy and carefully negotiated conditions for accession that would ideally lead to reduced levels of
government intervention in the market).
132. Press Release, World Trade Organization, supra note 17.
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including all foreign individuals and enterprises, irrespective of whether or not
they had invested or registered in China.'33 As part of the agreement, China
committed to accord them treatment no less favorable than that accorded to
enterprises in China with respect to the right to trade. 34 China promised that the
regulatory authorities for financial information services would be separate from,
and not accountable to, any service suppliers they regulated. 35 Unfortunately,
China has failed to establish such an independent regulator. 36 Xinhua is both a
major market competitor and a regulator of foreign financial information service
providers in China.'37
Provisions for foreign financial institutions to provide services in China
without client restrictions were set forth as a gradual, step-down process.'38 For
local currency business, foreign financial institutions were allowed to provide
services to Chinese enterprises within two years of accession, and were to receive
permission to provide services to all Chinese clients within five years of
accession. 3 9 China also agreed that price controls would not be used for purposes
of affording protection to domestic industries or services providers.' 4° Leveraging
a fee upon foreign news agencies to distribute news to Xinhua seems to be in
clear violation of this provision.'
4
'
China's accession agreement also contained certain "horizontal" commit-
ments, which apply to all sectors listed as services,'42 and, most importantly,
involve acquired rights. "' Under the acquired rights commitment, China agreed
that the conditions upon a foreign company's activities, as set forth in a
contractual or shareholder agreement or in a license, would not be made more
restrictive than they were on the date of China's accession to the WTO.'" In other
words, if a foreign company's pre-WTO accession rights exceeded the
commitments made by China pertaining to services, the company could continue
to operate with a minimum expectation of those rights, and only the possibility of
expansion rather than restriction.'4 5 China ignored this commitment by imposing
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 86. See also Senator Max Baucus, WTO: Will China Keep Its
Promises? Can It? (June 6, 2002), available at www.cecc.gov/pages/hearings/060602/baucus.php (explaining
how WTO members must establish and maintain mechanisms to review trade-related actions by government
agencies, which must operate independently of the agencies that carried out the actions in question).
136. USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 86.
137. Id.
138. See Press Release, World Trade Organization, supra note 17 (explaining the gradual increase in
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more restrictive regulations on foreign financial data firms than were previously
imposed.
46
China undertook a commitment to transparency' 47 by agreeing to provide a
reasonable period for public comment on new or modified laws and regulations
before implementing them, and that all trade-related laws and regulations would
be translated into one or more of the WTO languages (English, French and
Spanish) and published in an official journal.' 41 China, however, implemented the
Measures without soliciting public comment as required by their commitment to
the WTO. 49 As with many other laws, China instead chose to rely on multiple
channels, including websites, newspapers and a variety of journals to provide
information about the Measures, rather than provide access in a readily accessible
official journal.50
B. Consequences for Failing to Honor WTO Commitments
As the third largest trading entity in the WTO, the fulfillment of China's
obligations is of great concern. ' Much of China's imports and exports are the
result of foreign investors with facilities in China.5 5 Direct investment in China
amounts to over $500 billion and the confidence of investors depends heavily on
the degree of certainty that there will be reciprocity in allowing goods and
services into markets, including financial news.'53
Given the significance of China's apparent disregard for its WTO
commitments and its substantial role in the global economy, it is surprising that
the reaction to the Measures was rather cautious.'54 On December 11, 2006, the
USTR issued a report to Congress that stated that China's overall compliance
record is "decidedly mixed".'55 Although the report referred to the Measures as a
"major problem" in 2007, the U.S. proposed only to "closely monitor" develop-
146. Measures, supra note 2, at art. 12.
147. See Duncan, supra note 26, at 460 (defining transparency as the level of open and unimpeded
access to, surveillance over, and review of a country's governmental operations by other countries).
148. See USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 96-7 (stating that one of the most important commitments
concerned the procedures for adopting or revising laws and regulations affecting trade in goods, services, or the
control of foreign exchange, given that China's accession to the WTO became effective while China was still in
the process of revising its trade-related laws and regulations to become WTO-consistent); see also Baucus,
supra note 135 (explaining how WTO members may not enforce trade-related measures until they are officially
published).
149. USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 97.
150. Id. at 96.
151. See Alan Wolff, China's Compliance with Its WTO Obligations, CTR. FOR AMERICAN AND INT'L
LAW (June 15, 2005).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 5 (describing U.S. concerns about market access, and stating
that the U.S. has been making "earnest efforts" to resolve the concerns through bilateral discussions, and will
pursue "other options" if the bilateral approach is not fruitful).
155. Id. at 3.
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ments related to Xinhua's regulation of financial data,'56 and warned that China
will receive no special treatment should bilateral dialogue fail to address U.S.
157
concerns.
Indeed, by the end of 2007 no action had been taken with regard to the
Measures, which have not yet been widely enforced.5 8 However, despite
continued criticism in 2007 from the European Union's Trade Commissioner and
other foreign commerce officials, Xinhua still refused to do away with the
Measures.5 9 This could be indicative of mere stubbornness or a desire to remain
firm in the eyes of the global economy, or perhaps a signal that Xinhua is still
waiting for the perfect moment to exercise its control over foreign news agencies.
Many factors likely contributed to the U.S. decision to take a "wait and see"
approach towards Xinhua's regulation of foreign financial services firms rather
than take more aggressive action.' 60 First, China has made significant advances
since its accession in 2001, by repealing, revising or enacting more than one
thousand laws, regulations and other measures in an effort to bring its trading
system into basic compliance with WTO standards.
6
Although the Measures could potentially have an enormous impact on the
financial services sector, they are still just one set of regulations, quietly enacted
and apt to get lost in the shuffle as China overhauls its legal system.' 62 Progress
towards market liberalization only started to decline towards the end of the
compliance period in 2006,163 and this lack of momentum was apparently not
startling enough to overshadow China's progress in other areas.
Second, other areas of China's noncompliance, namely the failure to properly
address intellectual property rights (IPR) such as piracy and counterfeiting' 6 are a
greater cause for alarm. 165 The USTR report calls IPR the "number one issue" in
the bilateral economic relationship between the U.S. and China.'66 Still, WTO
156. Id. at 87.
157. See id. at 5 (stating that the U.S. will not hesitate to exercise its WTO rights through the initiation
of dispute settlement against China, as it would with any other mature WTO trading partner).
158. Chris Buckley, China Says Financial News Controls Obey WTO Rules (Nov. 27, 2007) http://in.
reuters.com/article/asiaCompanyAndMarkets/idINPEK32477120071127 (last visited Dec. 11, 2007).
159. Id. (Xinhua President Tian Conming still maintains that "The regulation is in line with Chinese
laws and regulations, and it is no breach of either WTO rules or China's WTO commitments."
160. USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 5.
161. Id. at 3.
162. See id. at 96-100 (stating that China committed to broad legal reforms in the areas of transparency,
uniform application of laws and judicial review. In the first year of WTO membership alone, China repealed
more than 800 laws and regulations, and issued almost 450 new or revised ones).
163. Id. at 4.
164. See id. at 6, 78 (stating that although China has enacted a relatively good set of laws aimed at
protecting IPR, critical measures such as establishing high thresholds for criminal prosecution still need to be
revised. Many U.S. industries reported no reduction in IPR infringement levels in 2006, and counterfeiting and
piracy in China remain at unacceptably high levels, causing harm to U.S. businesses in virtually every sector of
the economy).
165. Id. at 4.
166. Id.
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members should be careful not to focus predominately on any one area of
China's noncompliance because this focus could be precisely the diversion that
China needs to introduce more subtle, protectionist laws in other areas.'6 7
Third, the U.S. and other WTO members have enjoyed a prosperous
relationship with China, significantly benefiting workers, businesses, farmers,
service providers and consumers.' 68 Further, the current Bush administration has
set a tone of reassurance and encouragement towards China, with the goal of
improving the U.S.-China relationship. 69 China has been an important supporter
of the global war on terrorism, which has also drawn attention away from trade
issues over the past 5 years. 70 Overall, the U.S. had a substantial surplus in trade
in services with China in 2006, 17' even though Xinhua's regulations on financial
data were a step backwards in increasing market access and removing restrictions
in the sector. 1 2 It follows that the U.S. or other WTO member countries will
likely not aggressively seek a remedy until a concrete harm is more deeply felt,
and this is unlikely at an early stage. Lastly, the U.S. and other WTO members
may be optimistic that bilateral negotiations will achieve a desired result without
harsher tactics, because the mere threat of formal WTO dispute settlement has
proven effective in the past.
73
167. See generally id. (stating that the continued and expanding use of government intervention and
industrial policies could create even sharper frictions in bilateral economic relations than IPR).
168. Id. at 3.
169. See Michael Green, Press Briefing on U.S. China Relations and the Upcoming Visit of Chinese
President Hu Jintao, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L. STUDIES & INSTITUTE FOR INT'L ECONOMICS, (April 13,
2006), available at http://www.chinabalancesheet.org/Documents/060413-press brief.pdf (stating that one of
the main themes in a letter from the President in February 2005 was taking U.S.-China relations to the next
level and foster an improved, productive relationship).
170. See Kurt Campbell, Press Briefing on U.S. China Relations and the Upcoming Visit of Chinese
President Hu Jintao, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L. STUDIES & INSTITUTE FOR INT'L ECONOMICS, (April 13,
2006), available at http://www.chinabalancesheet.org/Documents/060413-press.brief.pdf (suggesting that there
have been fewer debates on China over the past couple years because the U.S. has been "focused elsewhere"
and that China has been a very important supporter in aspects of the global war on terrorism).
171. USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 9.
172. See id. But see China: The Balance Sheet, Trade Imbalance, available at http://www.
chinabalancesheet.org/Documents/ChinalpagerTradeSurplus.pdf (stating that in 2005, the U.S. bilateral trade
deficit with China exceeded $200 billion, accounting for more than one-fourth of its total imbalance. U.S.
imports from China now exceed U.S. exports to China by six times, so future U.S. exports would have to grow
almost six times as fast as imports just to keep the bilateral imbalance from increasing further. Therefore the
U.S. should not place too much emphasis on the trade surplus in the services sector alone).
173. See USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 5 (for example, in January 2006, after the U.S informed
China that it would file a formal request for WTO consultations in a challenge to antidumping duties that China
had imposed on certain imports, China rescinded the antidumping duties. This result enabled U.S. industry to
obtain a faster resolution to this problem than would have been possible if the dispute settlement process had
needed to run its course).
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C. Should All Else Fail: How the WTO Solves Problems
WTO dispute resolution is still an option if Member countries begin to feel
more far-reaching and undesirable effects of the Measures. There are two
different philosophical approaches to dealing with the issue of compliance:
managerialism and enforcement.1 4 Managerialism is based on the assumption
that states have a propensity to comply with their international commitments.175
Thus, when left alone, States will tend to manage their own compliance
behavior.'76 In contrast, enforcement theorists believe that external pressure is
required to bring about state compliance.'77
The U.S. has traditionally taken an approach that blends the two theories, and
monitors China's WTO compliance in three ways: unilateral actions,
intergovernmental coordination, and multilateral arrangements.' 8 The U.S. effort
involves the largest monitoring mechanism of any trade agreement, 79 with staff
posted in Washington D.C., Geneva, and major cities in China.80 The Trade
Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) is central to this effort and contains the Sub-
Committee on China's WTO Compliance responsible for coordinating U.S.
efforts to ensure that China complies with its WTO commitments.'' This inter-
agency group, chaired by the U.S. Trade Representative Office's Deputy
Assistant, brings together representatives from a variety of U.S. government
agencies, including the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, State, Agriculture,
and Labor.'82 The TPSC first met in December 2001 and is scheduled to meet
every month to consider China's obligations and progress, determine appropriate
U.S. responses, and submit annual reports to the government on China's WTO
compliance. 83
The TPSC is just one of three layers that make up the hierarchical structure
responsible for ensuring China's compliance.'84 While the actual monitoring and
174. See Gerald Chan, China and the WTO: The Theory and Practice of Compliance 11 (The Royal Inst.
of Int'l Affairs, Asia Programme, Working Paper No. 5, 2003).
175. Id.
176. Id. at I1-12.
177. Id. at 12.
178. See Chan, supra note 174, at 12.
179. See id. This effort is most significant with regard to China for several reasons: see U.S.-China
Business Council, US-China Trade Statistics and China's World Trade Statistics Table 7: China's Top Trade
Partners, available at http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html (showing that as of 2004 the U.S. was
China's largest trade partner); see also Karen Halverson, China's WTO Accession: Economic, Legal and
Political Implications, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 319 (2004)(stating that China is one of the newest WTO
members and is the only major WTO member that is still Communist).
180. Chan, supra note 174, at 12.
181. Id. at 13.
182. Id. at 12-13.
183. Id. at 13.
184. Business Alert-US, Amid Much Optimism, U.S. Turns to Monitoring China's WTO Compliance,
HONG KONG TRADE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, Issue 25, Dec. 17 2001, available at www.tdctrade.com/alert/
us0125.htm (on file with Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal).
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processing of incoming information takes place at the TPSC level, significant
policy questions are addressed by the Trade Policy Review Group.'85 The final
decision-making tier in this structure is the cabinet-level National Economic
Council, headed by the chief economic adviser to the President.'86
1. Transition Review Mechanism
The U.S. can rely on the Transition Review Mechanism (TRM) and the
Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO to get redress from China in the
event of non-compliance. 1 7 The TRM requires China to provide detailed
information to WTO members to give them the opportunity to raise questions
about Chinese compliance with its WTO commitments. 18 The TRM also
provides peer-group pressure on China for conformance to obligations.' 9 China's
trading practice is to undergo annual review in terms of its laws, regulations and
programs until 2009, followed by a final review during the ninth to the tenth year
after accession (2010 to 2011).' 90 The TRM process requires the sixteen
subsidiary bodies of the WTO with mandates covering China's commitments to
review China's compliance.' 9' China is under an obligation to provide relevant
information in advance of these reviews. 92 The results are reported to the WTO
General Council, which will then conduct the final review. 193
2. Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Any WTO Member country may invoke the WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism (DSM) when they feel that they have been treated unfairly by
another Member country.' 94 This system contains powerful remedies which
ensure a high level of overall compliance,' 95 and is highly effective because it
allows for the independent identification of major deficiencies by fellow WTO





187. USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 12.







195. See Jonathan C. Spierer, Dispute Settlement Understanding: Developing a Firm Foundation for
Implementation of the World Trade Organization, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 63, 96-7 (1998)
(comparing the GATT and WTO enforcement mechanisms).
196. Duncan, supra note 26, at 408.
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The DSM efficiently ensures compliance by focusing only on substantial
areas of non-compliance.' This is important because Members (particularly new
Members) are rarely in complete conformance with the WTO and its continually
broadening scope of obligations.' 98 An acceptable level of compliance does not
require perfection or precision, but rather the willingness and ability to conform
to a specific dispute settlement tribunal decision.' 99
The DSM process provides further insight into why WTO members may
initially choose less aggressive means to deal with China's non-compliance. 200
The complaining country can first ask the target country to discuss the issue
involved, but may take the case to the WTO for settlement before a tribunal if a
satisfactory agreement cannot be reached.2 °' If the targeted country fails to act
upon the advice of the tribunal, the complaining country may take retaliatory
measures against it.2°2 This process usually results in bilateral agreements and
compromises before the dispute reaches a trade tribunal, because countries in
conflict have an incentive to avoid various trade sanctions imposed on one
another during the long, drawn-out process which often can take several years.20 3
Informal discussions are less expensive and require less specialized expertise
than do formal procedures, and China in particular has traditionally preferred
mediation over other methods of dispute settlement,2 4 increasing the likelihood
of early settlement.
205
The most effective WTO response to the Measures would likely be the DSM
rather than the TRM, because DSM proceedings may be initiated any time, while
the TRM only provides for review on an annual basis.2 6 Also, the Measures are a
known instance of specific non-compliance and can be dealt with immediately,
without the need for the TRM's information-gathering benefits.2 °7 The fact that
Xinhua promulgated the Measures right before the end of the 5-year WTO
197. Id. at 409.
198. Id.
199. See id. (stating that ability to conform with a specific dispute settlement tribunal decision is the
most important indicator of a Member Country's compliance with VTO rules).
200. See id. at 471-97 (setting forth problems related to China's inability to implement DSM decisions,
such as difficulty in identifying the appropriate governmental body due to the "legal fragmentation" within
China, political will and lack of local government congruence).
201. Chan, supra note 174, at 17.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Duncan, supra note 26, at 496.
205. Id.
206. See USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 12 (stating that the TRM operates annually for 8 years after
China's accession, with a final review by year 10); see also Browne, supra note 3 (suggesting that if Xinhua is
using the Measures to copy the format and technique of other agencies in order to have a monopoly on financial
data in China, then time is of the essence in order to diminish this opportunity).
207. See Chan, supra note 172, at 17 (stating that China is required to provide copies of laws and
regulations, economic data and other relevant information in advance of TRM review. In the case of a
publicized law that is clearly in violation of WTO commitments, the TRM might be less effective since the
reporting procedures will not be an incentive for China to modify its laws and regulations beforehand).
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compliance period 208 further suggests that China is not likely to be influenced by
the possibility of review, because China knew that its compliance would be
closely scrutinized and widely reported in December 2006,209 yet still chose to
publicize and defend the Measures." °
V. CONCLUSION
Xinhua's attempt to control the flow of financial information in China
through the Measures for Administering the Release of News and Information in
China by Foreign News Agencies' clearly violates China's WTO commitment
to establish an independent regulator in the financial information services sector
and to expand, rather than restrict, the rights of foreign information service
providers."'
The Measures are a particularly blatant demonstration of non-compliance
because unlike other areas of concern, they are not the result of inadvertence,
passivity, lack of resources or poor planning." Instead, Xinhua took affirmative
steps to implement a set of regulations that undermine China's WTO
commitments just months before the financial services sector was to fully open to
foreign financial information services.24
Many factors combined in China's favor to result in a somewhat muted
initial reaction to the Measures. China made significant progress in many other
areas of WTO compliance, while failures in other areas were deemed so serious
that a rogue financial services regulation paled in comparison. 2 " The U.S. has
enjoyed a prosperous relationship with China since its accession to the WTO, 2,7
208. Measures, supra note 2.
209. With this date listed on many accession documents, it is reasonable to assume that there would be
follow-up procedures and reporting at this time'. See generally World Trade Organization, Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of China, supra note 7. See also Bremner & Roberts, supra note 8 (stating that
China's finance sector was to be fully opened to foreign banks on Dec. 11, 2006 under commitments made
when it joined the WTO).
210. See Associated Press, supra note 47 (summarizing Xinhua's various defenses and justifications for
the Measures).
211. Measures, supra note 2.
212. USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 87.
213. See Halverson, supra note 179, at 320 (explaining how China is still a developing country and their
insistence on being recognized as such under the WTO agreement. This suggests that China may have lacked
resources in some areas to effect full compliance); see also USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 70, 78 (stating that
problems related to China's poor IPR enforcement are legal framework deficiencies and market access barriers
which delay the introduction of legitimate foreign products into China's market. While equally problematic,
these shortcomings are relatively passive in comparison to the creation of new laws).
214. World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, supra note 7.
215. See USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 3 (stating that China has taken steps to implement numerous
specific commitments pursuant to schedules set forth in its WTO accession agreement).
216. See id. at 4 (stating that IPR is the "number one issue" in the bilateral economic relationship
between the U.S. and China).
217. Id.
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and may be reluctant to exert too much force until an area of China's non-
compliance causes a measurable financial injury, such as the major losses that
occur as a result of IPR infringement.28 WTO members may also place greater
faith in the negotiation process with China than the initiation of formal dispute
settlement procedures, given the track record of success through bilateral
negotiations with China2'9 and the lower costs of informal discussions. 2 0 Further,
the growth of the financial information services sector in the past decade reduces
the ability of the industry to organize and oppose the Measures, as giants Dow
221Jones and Reuters were able to do in the past.
Instead of treating China's advances and successes over the past five years as
"free passes" to negate or minimize failures, the WTO should recognize that each
instance of compliance represents China's capacity for progress. From this
perspective, China's demonstrated ability to modify its legal system to achieve
compliance in certain areas only seems to highlight the blatant nature of the
Measures, because China cannot claim lack of knowledge or experience as a
reason for allowing such laws to take effect when they clearly know better.
The full effects of the Measures on both foreign and domestic companies
have yet to be seen. As the U.S. and other WTO members continue to monitor
such developments, WTO mechanisms may compel China to rethink its policies
and interpret its WTO commitments more broadly.222
In the meantime, although companies doing business in or with China may
incur extra costs, liabilities or inconvenience, it is unlikely that the enforcement
of the Measures will cause all business transactions to come to an abrupt halt or
result in widespread pandemonium due to inaccurate reports. China is simply too
223powerful and savvy to allow that to happen. Rather, the Measures are indicative
of a larger and more pervasive climate of protectionism and exclusionary
tactics. 24 The most troubling aspect is that by introducing such legislation at a
time when it is likely to go unnoticed, China will achieve a "power grab" in
218. See Iyengar, supra note 125 (stating that including U.S., European and Japanese firms, the losses
on account of Chinese piracy is in excess of $50 billion annually).
219. Duncan, supra note 26, at 496.
220. See id. (stating that consultations are less expensive and require less specialized expertise than do
formal DSM procedures).
221. Hon, supra note 55.
222. See USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 4 (providing comment by unnamed trade association official:
"China's leaders currently face a choice: either to narrowly interpret WTO commitments and maximize the use
of government intervention to protect and nurture Chinese industries, or to apply the letter and spirit of the
WTO and recommit to the broadest possible use of markets to drive innovation, job creation, and economic
growth).
223. See Embassy of People's Republic of China in the United States of America, WTO Push to be
"Win-Win" for China, World, November 8, 2006, available at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t27
9343.htm (quoting Long Yongtu, WTO negotiator: "Chinese companies should not be so reliant on government
support and protection. They are much more powerful and competitive than they thought they were.")
224. See Duncan, supra note 26, at 423 (describing the difference that develops in socialist economies
for treatment for domestic and foreign business). See also USTR REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
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certain industries, resulting in damage not easily undone if and when the WTO
225takes more aggressive action.
The Measures are also troubling from the perspective of press freedoms,
because there can be no truly global media if a quarter of the world's population
is denied full participation, and no global economy if a major player is
persistently kept in the dark.226
China's most reliable path to economic growth and stability is one free from
protectionist policies and censorship,227 but it must be given an incentive to
follow this path .
225. See Browne, supra note 3 (stating that the Measures are a Xinhua land grab to limit the expansion
of economic-news vendors such as Reuters Group, Bloomberg LP and Dow Jones & Co., and eventually take
over their business).
226. See Anbin Shi, The Taming of the Shrew: Global Media in a Chinese Perspective, GLOBAL MEDIA
AND COMMUNICATION, Vol. 1 at 33, 2005.
227. See Keller, supra note 19, at 121 (discussing the commitment to the creation of a legal and
regulatory system that is fair and free of corruption, fostering a secure and predictable environment for
economic growth and investment).
228. Id. at 138 (stating that ad hoc, arbitrary methods of media control suit the interests of any regime
intent on retaining a monopoly on political power).
